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. There are, to be sure, citizens of established and of fledgling democracies who express considerable dissatisfaction with the performance of their regimes. But -and this is the second theme that emerges from my exercise in multi-national attitudinal mapping -the fact of dissatisfaction does not imply danger to the persistence or furtherance of democracy. There is a significant number of people spread around the world whom I label dissatisfied democrats. They clearly approve of democracy as a mode of governance, but they are discontent with the way their own system is currently operating. The dissatisfied democrats can be viewed as less a threat to than a force for reform and improvement of democratic processes and structures as the third wave continues to flow.
Since the beginning of the 1990s an unprecedented number of countries on the globe have implemented some variant of a democratic political structure. However, while formal institutions of representative democracy are in place, their likely persistence is subject to dispute and disagreement. This is true for both the old and the newly established democratic regimes. Crisis theories dominate the debate. have recently reviewed and empirically evaluated major hypotheses on why public support for democratic politics may be eroding. They and their collaborators did not find much empirical evidence for any of the various crisis theories, at least as far as the Western European countries up to the end of the 1980s were concerned. Overall, citizens of the Western European democracies had not withdrawn support for their democracies. Crisis theorists and other critics seemed to have underestimated the adaptive capacities of these countries' democratic institutions. In possible contrast, however, the newer democracies, and especially those in Central and Eastern Europe, are suffering stress because they have to cope with simultaneous political and economic transformations. Under these circumstances, arguments that predict a return to authoritarian rule or anarchy command some plausibility (for example, Ekiert, 1991) . Despite this plausibility, empirical analyses (especially those reported by Mishler and Rose 1994 , 1997 demonstrate that citizens of Central and Eastern European countries are prepared to face that double challenge. At least they do not want to give up their newly established democratic structures or to return to the old regime. Mishler and Rose (1997:447) summarize results of their most recent survey analysis as follows: "There is little basis in this analysis to fear that the collapse of democracy is imminent or that a return to authoritarianism is inevitable. To the contrary, as long as the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe protect the individual liberties that citizens so highly value, skepticism is unlikely to degenerate into distrust."
Most scholars agree that the survival of democracies rests on a broad and deep foundation of support among the citizenry. Democracies lacking such a foundation of legitimacy are at risk. Political systems, and in particular democracies, that are ineffective in 6 meeting public expectations over long periods of time can lose their legitimacy, with consequent danger to the regime. As broad theoretical assertions, at a high level of abstraction, this chain of reasoning is largely accepted by systems analysts and democratic theorists alike. But operationalization and measurement of concepts as well as sufficient historical and comparative data for test of the key linkages have proved largely elusive. Political and parallel academic developments in the late twentieth century have provided an opportunity to begin remedying these shortcomings.
This essay exploits the impressive resources of the World Values Survey to map certain key elements of political support among the mass publics in established, experimental, and would-be democracies. Specifically, I shall develop indices fitted reasonably well to the three forms of support highlighted in Table 1 : support for the political community ("identification with the political community"); for democracy as a form of government ("legitimacy of the political regime"); and approval of the regime's performance ("effectiveness of the political regime"). The extent of political support and approval along three dimensions is examined by means of comparable national surveys.
My argument here is that ordinary people can differentiate between different objects of support -between the political community, the desirability of a democratic regime, and actual regime performance. Further, they can be critical of how well the regime or the authorities are functioning without necessarily concluding that the democratic form of government needs to be abandoned. Dissatisfaction with the regime's or the incumbent authorities' effectiveness must not by necessity translate into delegitimation of democracy. Performance is not the only source of legitimacy. In contrast to non-democratic regimes legitimacy is also heavily based on procedures, too (Linz and Stepan, 1996) .
The Concept of Political Support
Scholarly insistence on the need for congruence between the form of governing institutions, on the one hand, and political culture, on the other, can easily be traced in an unending stream back at least to Aristotle. However, among modern democratic theorists, the concept of political support and its component elements is most commonly discussed with reference to the work of David Easton. Easton distinguishes between the objects of support and the types of support. Within objects, he distinguishes from each other support for the political community, the regime, and the incumbent authorities. Between types, Easton distinguishes between specific and diffuse support.
Building on and refining this framework, in the interest of operationalization, Dieter Fuchs (1993) offers a nine-cell taxonomy along two dimensions, as illustrated in Table 1. Fuchs' taxonomy of political support is similar but not identical to the one offered earlier by Easton. Fuchs' two dimensions are objects (which are identical to Easton's use of the same terms) and modes of attitudes, the latter moving beyond Easton's specific and diffuse terminology. Again, the three objects of political support are, in Easton's terms: political community, political regime, and political authorities. The political community is the cultural entity that transcends particularities of formal governing structures and enscribes the elemental identity of the collectivity constituting the polity. The regime is constituted of those formal institutions that persist and transcend particular incumbents. And the political authorities are those officials occupying governmental posts at a particular time. Thus a citizen might have adhered strongly to her or his status as a member of the Soviet Union as a political community without necessarily holding to the particular institutions of that political regime or even to the particular territorial definition of the polity. However, when a self-definition, such as Russian takes precedence over an alternative attitude object, such as Soviet, then the definition of political community is likewise different. One can also identify with the political community and still advocate a substantially different regime. A Pole, strongly identified with the Polish political community may nonetheless have been an ardent member of Solidarity and thus sought to depose the pre-1989 regime. And, finally, one could well accept the current Polish regime but campaign vigorously for the electoral victory of the opposition. Fuchs offers his three-part concept of modes of attitudes as a refinement of Easton's diffuse and specific types ( Table 1) . The expressive mode is focused not on the 8 performance of the object (community, regime, or authorities), but rather on certain attributes of the object itself. It is, in a sense, the "real" type of diffuse identification. The moral mode incorporates the idea of propriety. It is the sense that the status of the political community, regime, or authorities is a matter of appropriateness, or that it is right that things should be as they are, or that the investiture of office is as things should be -that they are legitimate. The instrumental mode rests upon explicit or implicit means-ends calculations. Thus, one who chooses to maximize employment opportunities by emigrating from one political community to another is acting instrumentally. Choosing to re-write the constitution (regime) or to displace incumbent officials (authorities) for comparable ends is likewise instrumental behavior.
Data from the World Values Survey allow for rather clear measurement of the forms of political support contained in the three shaded boxes in the Fuchs taxonomy (Table 1) , namely: identification with the political community, as well as legitimacy and effectiveness of the political regime. These attitudinal constellations will be mapped across countries by geographic regions, by age and relative democraticness of regimes, and by general level of economic development. A mapping of these components will be a significant start toward comparative understanding of the breadth and forms of political support across the world of established, fledgling, and would-be democracies near the turn of the millennium.
Surveys, time points and indicators
Today, in many countries, attitudes of citizens are monitored routinely. However, if it comes to the study of political attitudes across countries and time comparable data are not so easy to come by. Such efforts as the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and of the New Democracies Barometer (NDB), sponsored by the Austrian Paul LazarsfeldSociety, have done a lot to improve the situation.
In Figure 1 . These countries include about 45 percent of the world population. However, as already noted, limited availability of specific, comparable indicators restricts the number of countries available for different aspects of the analysis. Large-scale cross-national surveys are, by necessity, cooperative projects. Funding by a single source is virtually impossible to obtain. This implies that indicators which finally enter the questionnaire are a result of much discussion and some compromise or they are, as is the case of the surveys paid for by the European Commission, beyond control by academic researchers. For this reason analysts face problems of secondary analysis. They are obliged to use those indicators that finally entered the questionnaire, even though alternatives might have been preferred. This should be kept in mind when it comes to the choice of indicators for the different types of political support.
The immediate task is to test the extent to which key theoretically posited dimensions of political support can be identified within the available data.
Political Community. Two indicators are available for the measurement of support for political community. The first one taps the expressive mode of evaluation; the second one is closer to a moral mode of evaluation. The "country" serves as the attitude object in both cases. The respective survey questions read as follows: − "How proud are you to be a [citizen of this country]? (4) Very proud, (3) quite proud, (2) not very proud, (1) not at all proud;" 10 − "Of course we all hope that there will be not another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country? (1) yes, (0) no." Democracy as a Form of Government. Basic to my thesis here is that citizens can compare and evaluate alternative types of regimes, beyond merely assessing the immediate attractiveness of the particular regime with which they are currently living. Thus, inquiry into the attractiveness of democracy is possible (assuming authorities allow the research to be conducted) even among populations living under non-or quasi-democratic regimes. In the same sense that people can discriminate between specific incumbent authorities and the regime, so they can discriminate between their current regime and conceivable alternatives. Thus, the respondents in the World Values Survey were asked the following two questions regarding the object democracy:
− I am going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each would you say it is (4) a very good, (3) a fairly good, (2) a fairly bad or (1) a very bad way of governing this country?
− Having a democratic system. 5 − I am going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic system.
Could you please tell me if you (4) agree strongly, (3) agree, (2) disagree, or (1) disagree strongly, after I read each of them? − Democracy may have many problems but it's better than any other form of government '. 6 The two questions above tap the extent to which people find democracy as a form of regime attractive. The companion to our assumption that such an assessment can be made is also the assumption that the existing regime can be evaluated, to some extent independently of whether or not it is itself the most attractive among conceivable alternatives. Along with this goes also the assumption that people can distinguish between the moral propriety of the regime and its empirical performance.
Regime Performance. Four questions are used to measure regime performance:
− "People have different views about the system for governing this country. Here is a scale for rating how well things are going: (1) means very bad and 10 means very good. Where on this scale would you put the political system as it is today?" − "How satisfied are you with the people now in national office are handling the country's affairs? Would you say you are (4) very satisfied, (3) fairly satisfied, (2) fairly dissatisfied or (1) very dissatisfied?" − "I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it (4) a great deal of confidence, (3) quite a lot of confidence, (2) not very much confidence, or (1) none at all?" − The Parliament; − The Government in (Capital City).
In addition to these questions one widely used indicator for regime performance is available in the three regional surveys mentioned above. The reference object is the quality of the democratic process, that is the constitutional reality in the citizen's country. For the Western European and the Latin American surveys the relevant question reads as follows: 12 − "On the whole, are you (4) very satisfied, (3) fairly satisfied, (2) not very satisfied, or (1) not at all satisfied with the way democracy works (in your country)?" The question wording is slightly different for the Central and Eastern European surveys: − "On the whole, are you (4) very satisfied, (3) fairly satisfied, (2) not very satisfied or (1) not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in (your country)?" Despite the difference, these latter two indicators are treated as equivalent because of the specific historical contexts in which they have been used.
The dimensionality of political support
From what has been argued above we would expect dimensional analysis to yield the following three distinct factors:
− Support for political community, − Support for democracy as a form of government, and − Evaluation of the current performance of democracy.
The dimensionality is tested by (confirmatory) factor analysis both for the pooled data and for each single country. Table 2 shows that the pooled analysis strikingly bears out our expectation. The pattern which was predicted for theoretical reasons is clearly there. 7 This means that the analytically defined distinct types of political support are also kept apart in the minds of the citizens. This is an important finding. It means that one may meaningfully discuss identity with the political community independently of the form of government or its performance. Further, it enables the identification of people who are dissatisfied with the actual performance of democracy but at the same time support democracy as a form of government, the dissatisfied democrats. The analyses reported in Table 2 , thus, clearly confirm that these three dimensions are present and distinct across a multi-country (pooled) set of respondents. Given, however, that the general fit and specific factor loadings vary somewhat from country to country, it is less cumbersome to use the factor analysis to guide the construction of simpler, additive indices. 8 Thus, I have constructed three such indices -one for each of the three concepts. 9
− Support for Political Community: The variables "fight for country" (0/1) and "national pride" (recoded 1,2 = 0; 3,4 = 1) are added to form a three point scale of support for the political community: 1 = low support; 2 = medium support; and 3 = high support. Proportion of citizens with high support for political community are displayed in the respective tables. − Support for Democracy as a Form of Government: The variables "democracy best form of government" and "democracy good way of governing" are added to form a seven-point scale, ranging from 1 = low support to 7 = high support. Proportion of citizens with scale values 5 -7 are displayed in the respective tables. − Performance of Democracy: The variables "performance of the system for governing" (recoded 1-3 = 1; 4-5 = 2; 6-7 = 3; 8-10 = 4), "performance of people in national office" (1-4), "confidence in parliament" (1-4), and "confidence in government" (1-4) are added to form a 13-point scale: 1 = low performance to 13 = high performance. Proportion of citizens with scale values 8 -13 are displayed in the respective tables.
Support for political community
An expressed willingness to fight for one's country, combined with a high degree of national pride might be variously labeled. Here we use these questions for an index of support for the political community. At least on the surface, it would not seem to be much of a shift to label such attitudes either patriotism or nationalism. Often, in discussions of the positive aspects of political community it is indeed the case that the other side of the coin could be negatively assessed under the label nationalism. Whether or not one attaches a pejorative valence to the phenomenon depends, in part, on the context in which it is being used. However, it is indeed the case that, in the pooled analysis of all respondents over all of the countries included, the index retains its orthogonality with both approval of democracy and assessment of performance ( Table 2 ). The index of support for political community at least is statistically independent of and not antithetical to support of democracy as a form of government. Thus, the concept of political community, as conceptualized and measured here, may denote a benign form of patriotism and not necessarily carry a pathological connotation.
Support for the political community scale values range from 1 (low support) to 3 (high support). To aid in mapping from a cross-country perspective the countries are displayed and arrayed in Table 3 by the proportion of citizens with a high level of support for political community, divided in columns across regions. On average the mean level in 38 countries is 68 percent. 10 This average disguises a very high range of 75 percent points. It is not a goal of this essay to evaluate alternative explanations for the cross-national distributions along the dimensions of political support, however, some comment on the distribution in Table 2 is not out of order. Azerbaijan and Turkey rank highest; the two parts of Germany and Japan trail the distribution, with a level of support of 37 and 18 percent respectively. The latter finding confirms a well known pattern which has often been related to the World War II experiences of these countries. While in all other countries at least half of its citizens identify with their political community, the German and Japanese citizenry carry the burden of their nationalistic past quite visibly, resisting even what might be considered a form of salutary patriotism. As far as support levels for Azerbaijan and Turkey are concerned these two countries have to cope with challenges to a redefination of their respective political communities. However, the same is true for a number of the other newly formed Central and Eastern European states. In these cases the findings are mixed. Of the 14 countries included in the survey 7 range above average and an equal number range below average. The number of countries varies across regions not only because of the varying number of nation states in each region but also because of the relative success in organizing the World Values Survey in different countries. With these cautions in mind, there are no striking differences in support for the political community across regions that are comparable to those within the regional groupings themselves. Thus, the Asian range is from Japan's uniquely low 18 to China's relatively high 84 percent support for the political community. Eastern European countries range from 37 to 93 percent, and so on -a range far greater than the modest differences between regional means. Table 4 offers a different view of the map of support for political community. It arrays countries in three columns: older democracies, younger (Third Wave) democracies, and what might be entitled younger would-be democratic systems. Age of system does of itself seem to discriminate between the democratic systems, with the mean of the older systems at 64 and the younger at 61 percent high support for the political community. The countries with lower democracy scores, however, exhibit a rather higher mean score (69) than either the older or the younger democracies. Whether or not this is a reflection of the darker side of a sense of political community cannot be determined until more time passes during which progress toward democratization may or may not be registered in the currently low democracy countries. The political turbulence beneath the Third Wave of democratization heightened the sense of possible political change around the world. As interesting as the cross-national distribution of political attitudes at a single time, such as publics' support for their respective political communities, may be the likely changes in distribution of such attitudes. Certainly in light of the scholarly skepticism cited in the introductory section of this essay, any general downward trend would be cause for grave concern. The data for monitoring and mapping those changes, while far from ideal, are unprecedented in the history of social science. Thus, it is possible, for a large number of the countries included in the World Values Survey not only to examine cross-national distributions, but also to plot changes in certain attitudinal configurations. There is not a full complement of items included in the various scales for all multiple times across all 39 countries in this study, but some of the items have been repeated. Because most analyses claim that standards of comparison have changed we restrict cross-time comparisons to the period from shortly after the breakdown of the former communist regime to the most recently available data.
Are there any patterns of change in the mid-1990s, compared to a few years earlier? National pride can be compared over time for 24 countries, as reported in Table 5 . There is an increase in the proportion of citizens who are "very proud" or "quite proud" of their country in 9 countries (average increase 5 percent points), no change in six countries (+ or -2.5 percent points), and a decline in national pride in 9 countries (average decline 11 percent points). No country stands out with respect to increasing levels of national pride. As far as decline is concerned, it is most expressed in the three Baltic countries as well as in the two parts of Germany. There is a tendency of further increase in countries which are already high in national pride and a tendency of further decrease where national pride is already low. Data on changes in the readiness to fight, perhaps the more nationalistic of our two indicators, are available for the same 24 countries (Table 6 ). The proportion of citizens ready to fight for their country has gone up in 10 countries (average increase 10 percent points), has been stable in 4 countries (+ or -2.5 percent points), and gone down in 10 countries (average decrease 10 percent points). The average figures hide large country differences. A particularly large increase in the readiness to fight could be observed in two South American countries (Brazil +37, Argentina +20 percentage points); the largest decrease occurred in the three Baltic states (Latvia -30, Estonia -16, Lithuania -16 percentage points). However, unlike the apparent broadening of the range of national pride, there is no obvious general pattern to these changes in willingness to fight for the country. 
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Support of democracy as a form of government
The factor analyses reported in Table 2 reinforce the argument that the public's support for democracy as a form of government can be separated both analytically and empirically from the evaluation of performance of democracy. It should be clear where this is leading. It is leading to the suggestion, offered in the introduction, that persons dissatisfied with the current performance of democracy, especially in fledgling democracies, do not necessarily constitute a reservoir of anti-democratic sentiment. In fact, it may well be the case that those who support democracy as a form of government but also give a poor score to current performance of democracy in their own country -those whom I label as the dissatisfied democrats -may well constitute a potential force for improving rather than for abandoning the democratic experiment. Support for democracy as a form of government is measured by a seven point scale. The country mapping in Table 7 reports the proportion of citizens with a positive attitude (scale values 5 to 7). Support for democracy as a form of government is generally rather high in the 38 countries under study. Interestingly, the range is anchored and fully covered by the post-communist countries of Central Europe and the former USSR. As a set, these countries are not distinctive; nor are other geographic regional patterns apparent, other than the clustering of the Western Europeans on the higher end of the scale. The mean value for all 38 countries is 84 percent. Eleven countries, most of them West European states, have over 90 percent support for democracy as a form of government, suggesting that experience with functioning democratic regimes, with all their blemishes, far from leading to cynicism and rejection, reinforces citizens' commitment to that ever more widely accepted form of government. In another 16 countries democracy is supported by 8 out of 10 citizens. Russia shows the lowest level of support. Among the 11 countries where support ranges from 71 to 79 percent are another 5 Eastern European countries, 3 South American states as well as Finland and the Philippines. No additional insight emerges readily when, as in Table 8 , the countries are arrayed by system age and level of democracy. The high level democracies have not apparently disappointed their citizens, but the mean difference between the older (88 percent mean) and younger (86 percent) democracies is hardly worthy of note. Some doubt is spread among those not attaining a high democracy score, but still a large majority of the citizens of these countries approve of democracy as a form of government, thus perhaps warranting the reference to them as would-be democracies. 11 This would support the hypothesis that the attitudinal base of democracy can also be generated from within a non-democratic state. Thus, democratic attitudes must not, by necessity, be a product of socialization under the condition of democratic rule. 
Evaluation of performance of democracy
Data for evaluation of performance are available for 37 countries. The additive scale ranges from 1 (low) to 13 (high). In the mapping exercise, Table 9 displays the proportion of citizens with scale values 8 to 13. Compared to support for democracy as a form of government, evaluation of performance of democracy is considerably lower in all countries (average 26 percent). Only in such diverse countries as Azerbaijan, Norway and South Africa do more than half of the citizens evaluate performance highly. There is, in Table 9 , some evidence of a regional pattern, with the Western Europeans again, as a set, manifesting high assessments although, even there, the spread from Spain's 18 to Norway's 70, is much wider than the inter-regional means. No doubt, democracy thrives and can be built on a widespread, healthy dose of skepticism. And it is not at all clear where the bottom is for positive benefit. But surely in some cases these surveys must be tapping more than skepticism and moving more into the zone of dismay. There must be some concern for the situation in Russia (4 percent), the Ukraine (10 percent) and Belarus (8), as well as in Venezuela (6 percent) and the Dominican Republic (6 percent). In these countries taken together only 1 citizen out of 10 is satisfied with the performance of the respective political regime. Again, I must stress the value of separating support for democracy as a form of government from citizens' evaluations of the contemporary performance of their particular political regime, however much it may meet or stray from democratic norms. Thus, for example, 87 percent of Nigerians hold to the belief that democracy is the desired form of government, even though only 11 percent of them approve of the performance of their troubled political system (realistically, most would argue, in this time period). Likewise, over 89 percent of Turks support the principles of democracy, while barely a quarter assess contemporary performance highly. Such disparities are not confined to polities having long experience with such dramatic regime changes as military coups, as have both Nigeria and Turkey. There is likewise a broad difference in the support for and evaluation of democracy in both Germany's. Support for democracy as a form of government in the recently reunited parts of that country is 93 and 91 percent, West and East respectively, while evaluation of current performance is only 22 percent in the West and 15 percent in the East. Table 10 , arraying the countries again by system age and level of democratization, is perhaps more revealing in the case of evaluations of system performance than were its counterparts for support for the political community (Table 4) or for democracy as a form of government (Table 8 ). There is a stepwise decline in the mean evaluations as one moves from the older (mean = 32 percent) to the younger democracies (27 percent), and from these to the would-be democracies (23 percent). 12 Satisfaction with the way democracy works has long been used as an indicator for the citizens' evaluation of the performance of democracy in their respective countries (Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995) and it correlates .46 with the performance of democracy scale discussed above. 13 The indicator is not available for most of the World Values Surveys. However, it has been widely included in the three regional surveys mentioned earlier. This data-base allows for cross-national comparison for the mid-1990s for 50 countries (Table 11) . Among these are 17 Western European countries, 22 from Central and Eastern Europe, and eleven South American Countries. Satisfaction with the democratic process has not been particularly stunning in the mid-1990s. The average proportion of those who are very or fairly satisfied is only 40 percent. But again the average hides much difference across countries. While the Western Europeans, with the exception of the southern countries (Spain, Portugal, and Italy, in particular) are on the higher side (average, including the southern countries, is 56 percent), the Latin Americans are certainly on the lower end (average 29 percent). Of the Central and Eastern Europeans, Hungary, Slovakia, Belarus, Ukraine, Armenia, Russia, Moldova, and Bulgaria score very low, indeed. Change over time in performance is difficult to assess. In part, because the respective indicators are not available in a large number of cases, and in part because the indicators which are available are not exactly comparable. Table 12 , however, presents a very summary overview of averages for varying numbers of countries (depending on the source of surveys) of publics' evaluations of different facets of regime performance (for details compare Appendix 2). In general, the common theme of declining assessment of political institutions is reflected, with both the number of countries experiencing decline and the average percentage of declines generally exceeding increases. Confidence in parliaments is particularly pronounced, with 15 of 22 countries showing decline, and an average crossnational average of -12 percent points.
Satisfaction with the "democratic process", however, which already was at a low level at the beginning of the Nineties, showed fewer cases of decline than of increase, and the cross national average was an inconsequential -.3 percent points. More noteworthy, given their dramatic regime changes in the early 1990s, the Central and Eastern European countries experience equal numbers of increases as declines, with no net change -even given the much vaunted difficulties of readjustment, breakdown of law and order, corruption, dual economic and political transformations, and widespread governmental instability. It might be expected that the disappointment would be concentrated in the countries of the former USSR, compared to the others (perhaps placing the three Baltic countries in the latter set, as well). However, the surveys reveal no such -or any other obvious -pattern. Increases in confidence in the democratic process are registered in Albania, Romania, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Belarus, and Armenia, with declines in Georgia, Slovenia, Russia, Moldova, and Bulgaria. The absence of clear patterns is itself useful information. It suggests that there are no evident pathologies of confidence, across the board, uniquely challenging the new or wouldbe democracies. Their problems, to the extent that they are grave, seem to be specific rather than general. They point to the importance of political processes within countries. This turns the attention to the macro level. Let us conclude by highlighting a few critical macro observations that bring the threads of this discussion somewhat together.
Conclusion: Relationships Between Community, Democracy, and Performance
The factor analysis reported in Table 2 supported the utility of at least a part of the Easton/Fuchs taxonomy (Table 1) (Table 2 ) demonstrated that the indices used for these three concepts tapped clearly distinguishable and distinct dimensions at the level of individual survey respondents. That micro distinctness, however, does not rule out the possibility of interesting relationships between these three phenomena at the macro level. I shall conclude by presenting two graphs that demonstrate the extent to which such relationships may prove interesting. By way of introducing the relevant graphs of the different attitudes, I want to return to a theme raised earlier, namely the phenomenon of the dissatisfied democrats. This is the label I apply to those people who put a high rating on the attractiveness of democracy as a form of government but at the same time place a low rating on the performance of their particular democratic regime. For the present, I shall not distinguish between dissatisfied democrats in established, fledgling, or would-be democracies. Of course, extrapolations as to the systemic consequences of actions based on such a disjunction between desired and actual states would need to account for the setting in which the disjunction occurs. The likely actions of mobilized dissatisfied democrats in pre-or non-democratic systems would no doubt take very different form from their counterparts in functioning democracies. The former could be hypothesized, for example, as having a high revolutionary potential, while the latter might be expected to serve a reforming and enhancing role in their respective democracies. Some insight may be suggested by the aggregate relationships. Figure 2 plots on the vertical axis the percentage of high support for the political community. The horizontal axis is an aggregate relative of the dissatisfied democrats, in that it is the difference in the percentage of respondents expressing support for democracy as a form of government and the percentage evaluating the regime's current performance positively. Thus, the graph tells us that countries in which there is a wide disparity between the moral assessment of democracy and the instrumental evaluation of the system's performance of the system are also likely to be countries with a relatively low support for the political community. Thus, there is indeed a potential for erosion of the broadest, perhaps most basic identity within a polity that can be linked to the extent to which its performance matches the moral aspirations of the population. However, there is sufficient ambiguity in the fit of my measure to the concept of political community (as noted in the earlier discussion of patriotism and nationalism) and sufficient spread in the relationship to put this proposition on the agenda as just that -a proposition, worthy of further exploration. Similar material for further exploration is presented in Figure 3 , plotting countries according to the percentage approving democracy in the abstract versus the performance of their particular system. Again, good performance, at the system level, is associated with approval of democracy as an abstraction. However, the correlation is rather weak, thus, allowing for a typology which distinguishes between citizens who support or oppose democracy as a form of government and those who are satisfied or dissatisfied with the way democracy works in their respective countries. Figure 2 shows that performance cannot be ignored. The evidence of Figures 2 and 3 , to be sure, are consistent with the standing claim that effectiveness is a condition for legitimacy. However, I think the evidence is sufficiently mixed to underscore the need for considerable refinement, especially now that the range of national political experience has been broadened so dramatically and now that there is a growing body of heretofore hardly imaginable evidence available for more detailed exploration of the inner workings of embryonic, adolescent, and mature democracies. The data, remarkable as they are, do not provide all the answers to the questions posed here. However, the evidence is sufficient to invite a great deal more exploitation. My effort at mapping should serve as an introduction. But it also is consistent with other recent inquiry in casting doubt on the much-acclaimed "decline" or "crisis'" critiques of modern democracy. I can find no evidence of growing dissatisfaction with democracy as a form of government. Further, there is no apparent evidence that the dissatisfied democrats across the globe constitute a danger to democracy. Quite the contrary, they may well be the hope for the future of democratic governance. 
